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Continuity and change in the institution 
of town and country planning: Modelling 
the role of ideology 
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Abstract 
The institution of town and country planning rests upon ideas and concepts which will 
always be contested. Such concepts include ‘liberty’, ‘community’, ‘society’ and ‘the 
state’. It is a function of political ideology to seek to fix the meanings of contested 
concepts and thus exert control over political reality. By analysing the particular 
conceptual structure of the ideologies which seek to influence planning from positions of 
political power, the analyst can show how these ideologies are related to shifts in the 
conceptual and institutional structure of planning. The paper illustrates this analytical 
method in the context of the transition from the ideology of New Labour to the ideology 
of the Conservative-led Coalition government in England after 2010. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper suggests a theory for the study of the relationship between shifts in the 
political ideologies of national governments, and shifts in the institutional frameworks for 
planning at the national level over time. That there exists a relationship between ideology 
and planning policy and practice is by no means a novel insight (Foley, 1960). Much of 
planning theory engages with this idea to a greater or lesser degree. It is therefore not the 
fact that this relationship exists which is interesting. Rather, the interest and utility lies in 
trying to understand the nature of the relationship and through doing so, develop a deeper 
understanding of the political nature of planning and how its meaning and purpose may 
be subject to ideological influence which finds expression in institutional shifts at the 
political centre. 
 
There are many incarnations of the concept of ideology and each may reveal something 
different about planning. Eagleton (2007) identifies six different definitions of ideology 
which may here be simplified to three: the general production of ideas, beliefs and values 
in social life (an understanding which approaches the broader concept of ‘culture’); the 
mobilisation of ideas, beliefs and values in the promotion and legitimation of sectoral 
interests against opposing interests; and a third more pejorative form in which ideas, 
beliefs and values are mobilised to legitimise powerful interests through distortion and 
misrepresentation. Each of these broad definitions (which are by no means exhaustive) 
conceals a multitude of different but overlapping intellectual traditions and analytical 
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methods. The challenge is therefore to select a tradition which is suited to the analysis of 
the problem at hand. 
 
The problem is the indeterminacy of planning as an idea and activity and the related 
institutional instability of planning at the political centre. There is a well-remarked lack 
of consensus in the planning literature and in the world of practice as to what precisely 
planning is and what it should be aiming to achieve. There is also a history of reform and 
national institutional adjustments to planning in many national contexts, including the 
UK (Cullingworth et al, 2006; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012), the Netherlands (Nadin & Stead, 
2012; Zonneveld, 2005), France and Germany (Waterhaut et al, 2013). It is a truism that 
this indeterminacy and adjustment is partly a function of the variety of ideas, beliefs and 
values which influence the institution of planning at various points in its history and in 
various national contexts. 
 
This paper therefore proposes an approach for the study of the relationship between 
ideology and institutional changes in planning at the political centre which is based on a 
theory of ideology which frames it as comprising mutable structures of essentially 
contested political concepts whose role is to fix, control and simplify indeterminate and 
complex political meaning (Freeden, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2013). This ‘morphological 
approach’ therefore straddles the second and third definitions given above; it is about 
legitimation of sectoral interests as they relate to planning, which may involve a degree of 
distortion and misrepresentation through rhetorical effects. 
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Freeden’s morphological approach was developed to analyse the great political 
ideological families such as ‘liberalism’, ‘conservatism’ and ‘socialism’. However, 
planning is not an ideology in these terms. Contemporary planning is better conceived of 
as an institutionalised construct which has assembled over time under various ideological 
influences, rather than as an ideology which aspires to coherence and is aimed at 
delivering political transformation. Freeden’s approach therefore needs to be developed 
and adapted for the problem at hand.  
 
By incorporating insights from the ‘ideational turn’ in political science and discursive or 
constructivist institutionalism (Béland & Cox, 2011; Blyth, 2002; Schmidt, 2010), this 
paper theorises planning as comprising ideas and concepts which have discursively 
interacted with the policymaking process and been adopted as part of the institutional 
framework. Shifts in the meanings of concepts important to planning in the ideologies of 
those in political power can therefore be expected to be expressed in some way through 
shifts in the institutional framework for planning which is partly shaped by those 
concepts and the relations between them.  
 
In this theory, while planning is not a political ideology per se, it gains its form and 
structure by virtue of the fact that it is structured by concepts which are of key concern to 
political ideologies. It therefore becomes a focal point for deep contestation and 
institutional adjustment as political ideologies struggle to impose control over the terms 
by which these concepts are understood and, therefore, control the limits of what is 
thinkable in planning practice. The planning literature is more commonly concerned with 
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the analysis of instances of such practice. However, there is a need to develop a fuller 
understanding of what is happening at the political centre and how this creates the 
framework which shapes the terms by which practitioners conduct their work. 
 
The English context has been selected in order to illustrate the theory here. England 
provides fertile ground for the study of ideology and change in planning due to its near 
constant rate of seemingly ideologically-driven institutional shifts, so that ‘planning 
reform is now with us on a near permanent basis’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2015: 
29). The most recent period of significant change came following the election of the 
Coalition government in 2010, when a largely Conservative agenda for planning was 
swiftly introduced, resulting in the dismantling of significant parts of the national system 
which had been put in place by the previous Labour government. This included the 
abolition of national statutory regional planning, the introduction of a new tier of 
planning at the neighbourhood level, and the replacement of over 1,000 pages of national 
planning policy guidance with a single National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) of 
just under 60 pages. 
 
Due to the governance structure of English planning, whereby the direction for local 
policy is set at the national level by politicians and civil servants who are increasingly 
subject to the influence of privately funded think tanks (Haughton and Allmendinger, 
2016), it is clear that practitioners embedded within the institution at various scales have 
had their professional practice adjusted by shifts in the political thinking of those in 
positions of power in central government. Planning practitioners in England, whether 
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they be local authority planning officers, planning inspectors, High Court judges or 
consultants, have therefore been made subject to the intellectual influences of ideologues. 
The task is to analyse and understand this relationship. 
 
Theorising ideology: contestation and the morphological 
approach 
 
There have been few attempts to develop a theory of ideology as a tool specifically suited 
to analysing the relationship between national political ideologies and institutional 
adjustments in planning at the political centre over time. Such a theory needs a number of 
characteristics. It needs to be systematic and therefore capable of being applied in the 
same way to different instances of ideological change at different points in planning’s 
history so as to be able to assess the degree of continuity and change. It needs to 
acknowledge that political ideologies are not fixed, clearly bounded phenomena, but are 
plural, porous, subject to change and can move on to the ideological territory of rival 
systems depending on historical context. The theory also needs to accept that while 
political ideologies may aspire to coherence, they are often riven with logical 
contradictions and dilemmas. 
 
The morphological approach for the analysis of political ideologies has these 
characteristics and can therefore be adapted to help us think about the problem at hand. 
Developed by political theorist Michael Freeden, this approach conceives of ideologies as 
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‘distinctive configurations of political concepts…[that] create specific conceptual 
patterns from a pool of indeterminate and unlimited combinations’ (Freeden, 1998: 4). 
For Freeden, political concepts are the ‘units of political thinking’, and the ‘meaning’ of 
an ideology therefore derives from the morphology of political concepts comprising it. A 
concept such as ‘social justice’ or ‘public good’ therefore derives its meaning from how it 
relates to other concepts within an ideology. Crucially, this morphology is not fixed, but 
can shift across space and time. 
 
For Freeden, the concepts comprising an ideology are ‘essentially contested’. This 
explicitly draws on W.B. Gallie’s notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’, which are 
‘appraisive’, ‘internally complex’, and are ‘open to modification in the light of changing 
circumstances’ (Freeden, 1998: 55). Concepts identified as essentially contested include 
the ‘big’ political philosophical concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘liberty’. Due to this 
essential contestability, employment of such concepts ‘inevitably involves endless 
disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ (Gallie, 1956: 169).  
 
This understanding of ideologies simultaneously acknowledges a post-structuralist 
indeterminacy of meaning in language while also framing ideologies as structuring and 
‘cementing the word-concept relationship’ (Freeden, 1998: 76) through shutting out 
alternatives (a process Freeden refers to as ‘decontestation’): ‘the decontesting of political 
concepts performed by an ideology is an attempt to legitimate a preferred political order 
by controlling the meaning of key political words’ (Freeden, 1998: 117). Freeden gives 
examples of such concepts as liberty, rights, equality, justice, and democracy (Freeden, 
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1998: 61). In Gallie’s terms, to use such a concept ‘means to use it against other uses and 
to recognize that one’s own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses…to 
use it both aggressively and defensively’ (Gallie, 1956: 172). 
 
Importantly, the morphological approach emphasises the mutable structure of political 
ideologies. Freeden’s approach identifies three ‘levels’ or positions of concepts within the 
morphological structure of an ideology: the core, adjacent and peripheral. Concepts 
situated at the core of an ideology are of most fundamental importance, while the 
adjacent concepts furnish the ideology with greater richness and nuance. Peripheral 
concepts are of less fundamental importance to the structural integrity of the ideology and 
can include ‘perimeter’ concepts which are theorised as being ‘specific ideas or policy-
proposals rather than fully fledged concepts’ (Freeden, 1998: 78). Peripheral concepts are 
the means by which a political ideology interfaces with the political world. 
 
The conceptual structure of an ideology may change across time and space, thus changing 
the ideology. The English liberalism of 2017 is different from the English liberalism of 
1859, and both are different from American liberalism in 1993. All of these members of 
the broader ideological family of liberalism will have different implications for political 
institutions and policy programmes. There is therefore a specific concern with history in 
the morphological approach, which acknowledges the relationship between historical and 
spatial context and human consciousness. Ideology does not exist in a temporal and 
spatial vacuum; it can shape and be shaped by geography and history. Nevertheless, the 
role of an ideology is paradoxically to seek to confront this flux and fix the meaning of 
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the essentially contested concepts and, therefore, the meaning of political reality, 
however temporarily and imperfectly. 
 
Perhaps the most helpful element of Freeden’s method is that by focusing on concepts as 
units of analysis, his approach allows for a nuanced understanding of ideology whereby 
‘different’ ideologies may share some of the ‘same’ concepts, yet they are decontested 
and structured in different ways and therefore have different meanings. Or, alternatively, 
that the ‘same’ ideology may comprise concepts which become decontested and 
structured in different ways over time. Thus, the different ideologies of social democracy 
and liberal democracy might have the same conception of the concept of democracy 
within their structure (Dommett, 2012: 21), and these two ideologies may also change 
over space and time as a consequence of changes in their conception of democracy. 
Through this conception, we can therefore move beyond the simple two dimensional 
‘left-right’ axis of political thinking and into a theory which is able to model the richness 
and variety of ‘living’ ideologies and how they may change. 
 
The ideology of the institution of planning 
 
The morphological approach to the study of ideology has suggestive implications for a 
theory of the relationship between ideology and institutional change in planning. 
However, it needs to be adjusted to be suited to the analysis of the problem at hand. This 
paper therefore combines the morphological approach with insights from the ‘ideational 
turn’ in political science and discursive or constructivist institutionalism (Béland & Cox, 
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2011; Blyth, 2002; Schmidt, 2010) in order develop a theory which can help us think 
about the relationship between political ideologies and institutional change. 
 
If ideologies comprise shifting structures of essentially contested political concepts 
whose function is to simplify and control the proper meaning and structure of political 
thinking, then if a political idea such as planning is structured by some of those concepts 
which are hotly contested by competing ideologies, then planning will be a site for 
ongoing contestation as ideologies struggle for mastery over the meanings of concepts 
central to planning. Because ‘planning’ is itself a political idea (Reade, 1987: 177), 
change in planning then becomes partly a function of ideological competition over the 
proper meanings of the concepts which it shares with competing ideologies.  
 
The task for the analyst is therefore to identify those political concepts which are of 
structural importance to planning and which are shared with political ideologies, and to 
identify whether and how their meanings and relational structure has changed over time. 
The theorist can thus conceptualise planning as comprising a morphology of essentially 
contested concepts which give it form and meaning. Planning and the political concepts 
comprising it therefore become the objects of analysis. Yet, planning as object is also a 
subject because it is subjected to ideological influence. 
 
The conceptual structure of the institution of English planning at the centre can therefore 
be analysed in terms of how the political concepts that comprise it are decontested and 
their meanings temporarily fixed by those in positions of political power. In this way, 
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Freeden’s theory for the analysis of ideologies can be adapted to the analysis of an 
institution as comprising institutionalised ideas and concepts (Hay, 2002, 2009; Schmidt, 
2008, 2010, 2011). This form of analysis does not therefore seek to identify the ideology 
of planning. Instead, it seeks to identify the ideology of the institution of planning. That is 
to say, through an analysis of the institutionalisation of various contested concepts at 
various points in time, the ideology (or ideologies) of the institution of national English 
town and country planning may therefore also be analysed. 
 
The contested concepts of key structural importance to planning will be different in 
various national political contexts. However, in the English context such concepts include 
liberty, property, the state, society and community1. These concepts have been at the very 
heart of the institution of English planning since its stirrings in the decades leading up to 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 and the subsequent nationalisation of 
development rights, which according to a contemporary commentator institutionalised 
‘the affirmative claims of the community upon property rights to an extent never before 
seen in common law countries’ and in doing so represented ‘a significant change in 
Western thought with respect to the balance struck between the individual's rights in land 
as against those of society’ (Haar, 1951: 2). 
 
Indeed, planning is the policy area par excellence for thinking about the proper degree of 
state intervention in private property rights and personal freedoms in the interests of the 
freedoms of wider society and local communities. This is what planning is about at its 
                         
1 Other concepts include ‘Plan’ and ‘Town’ and ‘Country’, but the role of these concepts is not analysed in 
this paper. For a fuller analysis, see Shepherd (2016). 
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core. In planning theory, we are used to thinking of contested concepts in terms of 
concepts such as ‘sustainable development’, ‘region’ or ‘public interest’ (for other 
candidates, see Parker and Doak (2012)). However, within the theory proposed here, 
these concepts become adjacent to core concepts such as liberty, the state, community 
and society. These adjacent concepts arise to furnish the core concepts with greater 
nuance and give them a spatial and environmental dimension. They find concrete 
expression at the ideological periphery in policy ideas such as ‘Environmental Impact 
Assessment’, ‘regional spatial strategy’ and the various forms of land value capture 
policies to name a few. The task of the analyst is to trace these relationships. 
  
This theoretical framework will now be briefly illustrated through a summary of the 
ideological contestations surrounding the creation and abolition of statutory regional 
planning and the introduction of a more ‘local’ form of neighourhood planning shortly 
after the election of the Conservative-led Coalition government in 2010. These are just 
two of the many planning reforms introduced, so what follows does not claim to be a 
complete analysis of the relationship between political ideology and institutional change 
at that particular time. It focuses only on the articulation of a small number of concepts. 
However, it is hoped that by setting out such a ‘snapshot’, the potential of the theory to 
more broadly analyse the relationship between political ideologies and institutional 
change in planning in different times and geographical contexts may be made clear. 
 
However, as the period of UK political and institutional history being analysed here is the 
transition from the New Labour government of 1997 - 2010 to the Conservative-led 
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Coalition government of 2010 - 2015, the British political context will now be briefly 
summarised for the benefit of those not familiar with British politics.  
 
The British Political Context 
 
The Labour Party was elected to power in 1997 after 18 years of Conservative rule. The 
‘New Right’ Conservative leadership of Margaret Thatcher and then John Major had 
succeeded in neoliberalising the political landscape, so that by the 1990s the socialist Old 
Left of the Labour Party seemed antiquated. The Labour Party would therefore have to 
respond by ‘modernising’. This would give rise to New Labour. 
 
Tony Blair was elected as leader of the opposition in 1994 and the New Labour agenda 
was put into action. Blair swiftly announced plans to recast the aims and values of the 
party, and in 1995 revised the wording of Clause IV of the Labour Party’s constitution, 
removing the party’s commitment to the ‘common ownership of the means of production’ 
and replacing it with an emphasis on the ‘strength of common endeavour’ to create a 
community in which ‘power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many, not the 
few’ (Labour Party, 2014: 3). The Labour Party now had new freedom to adjust its 
political project and respond more flexibly to what leading party figures saw as a new 
political and economic context to which old ideas could no longer apply unaltered. 
 
New Labour’s resultant ‘Third Way’ project was based on ‘uniting the two great streams 
of left-of-centre thought - democratic socialism and liberalism’ (Blair, 1998: 1). This 
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involved rediscovering the concepts of liberty and community which had previously been 
emphasised as part of ethical socialism and the communitarian liberalism of T.H. Green 
(1836-82), J.A. Hobson (1858-1940) and L.T. Hobhouse (1864-1929), for whom 
liberalism meant ‘a fuller realisation of individual liberty contained in the provision of 
equal opportunities for self-development’ (Hobson as quoted in Eccleshall, 1986: 204).  
 
This represented a transformation in how the concept of liberty was understood, from the 
emphasis on ‘negative’ liberty of classical liberalism which conceptualised the individual 
as a rational self-determining agent with ‘freedom from’ constraint in the context of the 
assumed rationality of an ideally non-constrained market, to a more ‘positive’ conception 
of liberty (Berlin, [1958] 2001). This meant ‘a positive power or capacity of doing or 
enjoying something worth doing or enjoying…a power which each man exercises 
through the help or security given him by his fellow-men’ (Green, 1888: 371); in other 
words, a conception of liberty implying an individual with ‘freedom to’ rationally self-
develop and grow within a mutually supportive collective in the context of a market 
constrained only to the degree required to support this form of liberty. 
 
This implied a role for redistributive state power to help remove social and economic 
inequalities and create the conditions in which individuals and communities have more 
equal opportunities to develop. It was this kind of political thinking which partly lay 
behind the establishment of the welfare state in Britain in the 1940s to which the origins 
of the modern institution of English planning were closely related. However, for New 
Labour equality of opportunity for self-development would not be secured mainly 
15 
 
through state redistribution, which would be relegated to be just one of many means, and 
‘emphatically not an end in itself’ (Blair, 1998: 1). Thanks to the liberal strand of New 
Labour ideology, economic growth would also be a means by which social justice 
objectives could be secured. It was for these reasons that the 2005 Labour Party 
manifesto claimed that ‘economic dynamism and social justice must go hand in hand’ 
(Labour Party, 2005: 15). The Third Way was therefore an amalgam of social democratic 
and liberal ends, to be delivered through flexible means. 
 
New Labour won the 1997 general election and in the ensuing 13 years seemingly 
succeeded in adjusting the political terrain again, to reflect New Labour’s ideological 
project. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party floundered. When David Cameron was 
elected leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, he inherited a party which had lost three 
general elections in a row and was in disarray. Cameron engaged in a project to 
ideologically reposition the Parliamentary Conservative Party so that it could pose a 
realistic challenge to New Labour’s territory (both ideological and electoral). 
 
This would involve reconnecting with an older ‘One Nation’ (and ostensibly more 
socially aware) current of conservative thought (Dorey, 2007: 162), and through it 
apparently acknowledge the concept of social justice, which was to be radically 
transformed by an accompanying ‘potent anti-statism and emphasis upon individual 
responsibility’ (Evans, 2010: 327). The Conservative Party would therefore be able to 
claim in Built to Last: the Aims and Values of the Conservative Party that it would ‘fight 
social injustice and help the most disadvantaged by building a strong society’ 
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(Conservative Party, 2006: 5), but without calling for an expansion in the size of the state 
in order to deliver it. 
 
Instead, the concept of community (transformed from that used by New Labour) would 
be called on to fill the conceptual space left by a receding state. This would be coupled 
with a neoliberal conception of liberty, whose destabilising tendency would be 
theoretically controlled by the call for communities to take responsibility for looking after 
each other and their neighbourhood’s physical fabric, identity and institutions, while still 
allowing for a continuing emphasis on individual responsibility and enterprise within a 
market economy. The interaction of the Cameronite decontestation of the concepts of 
liberty, community, society and the state would result in an overt localist impulse. 
 
It is this ideological amalgam which would provide the overarching framework which 
would shape the Parliamentary Conservative Party’s programmatic and policy ideas 
relating to planning. However, the electorate was not fully convinced and Cameron could 
only deliver a partial victory in the 2010 general election. The Conservative Party was 
forced to form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, an uneasy alliance 
which lasted until 2015 when Cameron finally delivered a full general election victory. 
 
New Labour - conceptual contestations 
 
In accordance with the liberal strand of New Labour’s ideology, a key role for planning 
was initially framed as being to function predictably and efficiently so as to promote 
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greater economic development (DTLR, 2001, 2002). We see here what looks like a 
continuation of the New Right neoliberal ideology. However, what prevented the New 
Labour ideology as manifested in the institution of English planning from being a 
continuation of the agenda set by the New Right was the insertion of the concept of 
community, an adjusted concept of liberty, and a different understanding of the enabling 
state in planning terms. The interaction of these abstract concepts would find institutional 
expression through the adjacent concept of the region, the peripheral concept of the 
regional spatial strategy and the extension of central state power through statutory 
planning these concepts represented. 
 
According to the ideology of New Labour, the planning system was a means which could 
contribute to communitarian ends through helping to enable the smooth operation of the 
market and the growth of the economy in the interest of a broader distribution of 
opportunity and freedom to self-develop. The state would ostensibly play a supporting 
and enabling (rather than controlling) role in helping this to happen. This vision for the 
state allowed the space for an old social democratic concept to re-enter the core of the 
ideology of the institution - that of ‘community’ (as a transformed manifestation of the 
broader concept of ‘society’). 
 
The concept of community ‘has been a persistent one in socialist thinking’ (Barker, 1997: 
270), and has traditionally meant for social democrats ‘an egalitarian and cooperative 
society in which individuals identified with the commonwealth at least as much as with 
their own material advantage’ (Bevir, 2005: 69). It is also a concept core to the 
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communitarian liberalism which New Labour ‘rediscovered’, for which community was a 
means by which the rational self-development of individuals could be mutually supported 
for the common good.  
 
By emphasising the concept of community, New Labour was therefore able to stress ‘the 
commitment individuals have as citizens, and the responsibilities they owe in exchange 
for certain benefits and rights they are entitled to’ (Beech, 2004: 95). Crucially, it ‘denies 
that successful economies live by competitive individualism alone’ (Driver & Martell, 
1997: 33), and therefore enabled New Labour to differentiate itself from the neoliberal 
New Right and its seemingly ‘uncaring’ denial of a collective and cooperative society.  
 
Furthermore, by calling upon the concept of community rather than that of ‘society’ 
which for ideological opponents had statist connotations due to the perceived tendency in 
socialism of allowing the state to assume a too powerful role as arbiter of societal good, 
New Labour sought to distance itself from the caricature of monolithic and controlling 
statism which critics of socialism so detested. The concept of community was thus 
summarised by Blair as ‘a modern idea of community ... which applauds and nurtures 
individual choice and personal autonomy and which recognises the irreducible pluralism 
of modern society’ (as quoted in Buckler, 2007: 46). It was therefore a concept of 
community which welcomed social freedom and multiculturalism. 
 
What the core concept of community and its relationship with the enabling state meant 
for the ideology of the institution of national English planning was an apparent emphasis 
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on the devolution of power to local communities to determine development in their own 
interests (Tewdwr-Jones, 2002: 58). The 2001 Labour Manifesto stated: ‘Government 
cannot achieve social inclusion for people, but it can help them achieve it for themselves, 
by transferring power and opportunity to local communities’ (Labour Party, 2001: 24). In 
this sense, the core concept of liberty was interpreted to mean freedom to realise planning 
and development opportunities for the good of the community, through a simultaneous 
greater degree of freedom from overt centralised state direction and control. The 
government green paper Planning: Delivering a Fundamental Change (DTLR, 2001), 
alongside a ‘business agenda’, therefore emphasised the need to engage the local 
community, ‘including local business, residents, tenants and voluntary groups’ (DTLR 
2001: 16), and local authorities were required to develop Local Strategic Partnerships to 
‘establish effective mechanisms for community involvement’ (DTLR 2001: 16). 
 
However, this form of localism was in actuality not to be without a significant degree of 
strategic state oversight. There was not to be enhanced negative freedom from centralised 
state intervention, and there was not to be significant devolution of plan-making power to 
local communities. Towards the end of the Thatcher period and then under her successor 
John Major, there was a shift away from the ‘project-led’ planning system towards a 
more strategic and ‘plan-led’ system which saw a partial revival of regional planning and 
a proliferation of national planning guidance (Allmendinger & Thomas, 1998). This shift 
was continued and consolidated by New Labour and, through this, the concept of the 
region assumed key structural importance in the ideology of the institution of planning 
through its position adjacent to the core concepts of the state, liberty and community. It 
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would be through the concept of the region that New Labour’s positive conception of 
liberty and the state supervision it called for would find expression and the tensions 
inherent in its ideology would manifest. 
 
The government green paper Planning: Delivering a Fundamental Change (DTLR, 2001) 
set out the proposed response of the planning system to the new regionalist agenda. It 
proposed replacing regional planning guidance with statutory Regional Spatial Strategies 
(RSSs) which would ‘outline specific regional or sub-regional policies, address the broad 
location of major development proposals, set targets and indicators where necessary’ 
(DTLR, 2001: 21). The proposals were reiterated in Sustainable Communities: Delivering 
Through Planning (DTLR, 2002) and were formally introduced through the Planning and 
Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. 
 
The concept of the region, and the form of planning it represented, acted as a focal point 
for latent tensions in the ideology of the institution of English planning under New 
Labour. Regional planning was framed as representing devolution of power away from 
central government to the regions, and therefore the redistribution of freedom of 
opportunity at regional and local community level. However, the introduction of statutory 
RSSs inserted an additional level of statutory planning at the regional level in between 
national planning guidance, and local plans while abolishing county-level structure plans. 
The new RSSs would be prepared by Regional Assemblies which were indirectly elected 
regional bodies partly comprising representatives from county and district councils. The 
concept of ‘community’ in this context was therefore not very local. 
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In theory the planning space created by RSSs would be filled from the bottom up, and not 
from the top down. However, given that RSSs had to be in accordance with national 
planning guidance (checked by central state ‘outposts’ Government Offices for the 
Regions), that local plans had to be in accordance with them, and that they imposed 
targets for housing delivery on sometimes unwilling local authorities, they can also be 
seen as avatars for the central state at regional level. This was a view taken by 
Conservative shires, whose opinions were voiced by Conservative MP Eric Pickles who 
saw RSSs as reducing the degree of freedom at county and local level by ‘dragging in a 
more remote regional authority, thereby breaking the link with decisions made by local 
people’ (HC Deb 17 Dec 2002, c 738), while New Labour thinking saw them as a 
necessary expansion of state power into regional political and geographical space in order 
to provide strategic oversight and ensure that the benefits of economic growth and good 
planning could create a broader distribution of opportunity and, therefore, freedom.  
 
This reveals the tension arising from the New Labour ideological project of combining 
liberal with social democratic ideas, particularly around the concepts of liberty and the 
state. On one hand, the ideology held that the planning system should be more 
streamlined and responsive to business in the interests of economic growth and the 
broader distribution of opportunity it would bring. This would require a ‘light touch’ 
enabling state at the local level, and partnership and cooperation at the regional level so 
that communities could come together and deliver economic growth in a way responsive 
to regional context and free from too much central state direction. As such, regional 
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planning was presented by New Labour as a devolution of power away from the central 
state and, in theory, greater freedom for local authorities and communities. On the other 
hand, local authorities (and the communities they represent) could not be trusted by New 
Labour to be given the responsibility to come together and work effectively at regional 
level without a statutory requirement from the centre to prepare an RSS which had to plan 
to deliver centrally-set housing targets.   
 
This distrust of the local level of state activity in the ideology of the central institution of 
English town and country planning at the time can be seen as an example of what Jessop 
(2003: 152) has identified as the ‘disciplinary role’ of the state under New Labour, as this 
statutory requirement represented a significant degree of central state intervention in 
regional (and local) affairs. Such central state involvement by New Labour suggests that 
it was ideologically predisposed to expanding state intervention through planning (in the 
interests of coordination to achieve a broader distribution of liberty through opportunity 
in the market), despite its other ideological emphasis on the need for an efficient and 
enabling state. 
 
It would be these statutory regional aspects of planning and associated regionally-
imposed targets for the delivery of housing which would be particular areas of argument 
in the years up to and following the election of the Conservative-led Coalition 
government in 2010. This was partly due to the fact that the concepts of liberty, the state, 
society and community were important concepts in conservative ideology as well as New 
Labour’s, but that they were decontested and articulated in different ways. This 
23 
 
fundamentally changed the role of the concept of the region in the ideology of the 
institution of planning, and therefore in the policies associated with it. Furthermore, the 
incoherence of these policies when taken together can be seen as being partly a function 
of the underlying incoherence of the abstract conceptual structure of the dominant 
ideology in the Conservative Party at the time, resulting from an attempt to reconcile 
fundamentally competing ideological imperatives arising from the intersection of a more 
‘negative’ form of liberty, and a conservative conception of community. 
 
Cameronite Conservatives - conceptual contestations 
 
When David Cameron was elected as leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, he 
engaged in a campaign to ideologically reposition the Conservative Party so that it could 
pose a realistic challenge to New Labour. To achieve this, he drew on the thinking of a 
number of key figures in and around the party. These included David Willetts who 
developed the concept of ‘Civic Conservatism’ which was an attempt to ‘reconcile free 
markets (which deliver freedom and prosperity) with a recognition of the importance of 
community (which sustains our values)’ (Willetts, 1992: 92); Oliver Letwin who 
developed the conservative concept of the ‘Neighbourly Society’ and who would go on to 
be a main architect of the Coalition agreement in 2010; and Philip Blond, a centre right 
academic. In different ways, these thinkers were concerned with the proper meaning of 
and relationship between the concepts of liberty, society, community and the state, and 
how a rearticulation of these concepts within conservative ideology might be employed to 
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update the Conservative Party. This rearticulation of the ideology of the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party would have significant implications for the institution of planning. 
 
A key concern of Willetts and Blond in particular was how to manage the threat to British 
conservatism which was posed by the implications of the New Right’s insertion of a 
neoliberal conception of liberty into Conservative Party ideology. This threat arose from 
the tension between this conception of liberty (as freedom from coercion and the 
economic and social liberalism this implied), and a conservative conception of society. 
Given Margaret Thatcher’s infamous claim in an interview with Woman’s Own magazine 
published on 31 October 1987 that ‘there is no such thing as society’, it may seem 
contradictory to claim that ‘society’ is an important concept in conservatism. However, 
the concept of the ‘organic society’ is a crucial element of a more traditional pre-
neoliberal ‘One Nation’ English conservatism. This is a vision of society that is steeped 
in a respect for history and tradition, and therefore sees the existing identities and 
institutions of society as having arisen ‘naturally’ or ‘organically’ and therefore valuable 
in their own right and to be conserved (Heywood, 2012: 75). 
 
This means that the neoliberalisation of the Conservative Party under the British New 
Right after 1979 could be perceived by some traditional conservatives as a threat. This 
has been expounded in some detail by philosopher John Gray: ‘Market 
liberalism…fosters a privileging of choice and a cult of mobility that consort badly with 
the settled communities cherished by traditional conservatives’ (Gray, 1997: 23). A 
surfeit of social and economic freedom therefore poses a threat to those histories, 
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traditions and identities which the conservative is supposed to want to conserve. The 
unsettling dynamism of a neoliberal conception of liberty also brings with it the loss of 
valuable local knowledge, which is rendered ‘obsolete or irrelevant to the operation of 
market processes that are themselves ever more disembodied’ (Gray, 1997: 40). A 
conservative should mourn this loss, ‘because such knowledge is constitutive of our very 
identity, is a central value in any outlook that is truly conservative’ (Gray, 1997: 39). 
 
However, whereas Gray concluded that ‘[t]he hegemony, within conservative thought 
and practice, of neo-liberal ideology has had the effect of destroying conservatism as a 
viable political project of our time’ (Gray, 1997: 3), David Willetts took a different view. 
Willetts argued for a conservative engagement with the ‘creative tension between…our 
belief in individual freedom, private property and the market economy on one hand, and 
on the other a commitment to maintaining the institutions which hold our nation together’ 
(Willetts, 1997: 169). Willetts, addressed this ‘creative tension’ (or underlying 
incoherence) by retaining the concept of liberty as central to modern conservative 
thought, while arguing that it needed to be anchored somehow, so that its destabilising 
influence could be controlled. It was the concept of community and, through it, the 
broader concept of society which could perform this function. For Willetts, the Party 
needed to acknowledge a ‘Conservatism not just of economic and personal freedoms but 
also of social reform to create a stronger society. What it understands is that freedom is 
not enough on its own’ (Willetts, 2005). The conception of community invoked was 
therefore a distinctly conservative one which viewed it as a ‘source of stability’ with 
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community relationships acting as ‘a source of moral regulation rather than free self-
development’ as under New Labour (Buckler, 2007: 42). 
 
This chimed with Blond’s analysis, for whom the solution must be ‘grounded in a 
conservatism with deeper roots than 1979, and whose branches extend into the tradition 
of communitarian civic conservatism’ (Blond, 2009). Blond thus argued for a radical 
conservatism which acknowledges the value of local communities and institutions in 
combination with a suspicion of the remote and totalitarian ‘monopoly capitalism’ which 
is the result of international market liberalism. Willetts and Blond therefore sought to 
position the concept of community as a stabiliser to a neoliberal form of liberty. In doing 
so, they sought to refocus from the atomised individual economic agent ‘floating freely, 
untrammelled by ties, culture or history’ (Willetts, 1997a: 82), to the agent as a node 
within a community network comprising individuals bound together through valued 
national and local institutions. 
 
There are obvious similarities here with the New Labour ideological project. New Labour 
had also invoked the concept of community in order to balance the individualism implied 
in the concept of liberty which it reclaimed from its ethical socialist past, but which had 
been transformed by the post-New Right neoliberal context. The concept of community 
was therefore employed to legitimise the Party’s turn to liberalism and differentiate itself 
from the ‘uncaring’ Conservative Party through its connotations of communal fellowship. 
New Labour with its championing of multiculturalism was less concerned with the 
challenge of market liberalism to traditional community identities and institutions which 
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so preoccupied conservative minds. Furthermore, New Labour’s more positive 
conception of liberty, which emphasised equality of opportunity to rationally self-develop 
within a community also brought with it a degree of redistributive state intervention and 
oversight which was anathema to conservatives. For New Labour, individuals within a 
community could achieve self-development through the supportive operations of the 
state.  
 
For conservatives such as Willetts, Blond and Letwin however, such state activity posed a 
threat to traditional communities by suppressing local identity. It also represented an 
unacceptable constraint to individual liberty which was decontested in conservatism in a 
more negative sense, particularly following the neoliberalistion of the 1980s. The 
implications of a retained yet controlled neoliberal conception of liberty was a continued 
mistrust of attempts by human reason to predict, control and plan as this would represent 
an unacceptable level of interference with the natural and organic order of society and the 
market which was conceived as the forum in which society could find free expression. It 
is these relationships between the concepts of liberty, community, society and the state 
which was the focus of Letwin’s Neighbourly Society concept. 
 
Letwin, who oversaw the authorship of a set of three interlinked Conservative Party green 
papers which were produced in the run-up to the 2010 general election and which set out 
the party’s programme for town and country planning (Conservative Party 2009a, 2009b, 
2010), has rhetorically argued that ‘when the Left say 'society'…they inevitably mean the 
state’ (Letwin, 2002). It was this which he saw as lying behind the overtly centralised 
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bureaucracy which was a product of New Labour’s belief that ‘the State is the great 
engine by which society will improve the condition of mankind’ (Letwin, 2003: 46). 
However, for Cameronite Conservatives the effect of such state intervention was to erode 
society, not strengthen it (Evans, 2010: 331). Instead of the state solving people’s 
problems, responsibility (and therefore empowerment) must fall to ‘a society composed 
of active citizens, strong families and of neighbours who look out for each other’ 
(Letwin, 2002). In short, a society comprising strong local communities.  
 
For Letwin, the synthetic (rather than organic) bonds created by the central state should 
play less of a role in society and interfere less in local communities because it is the 
impulse to create social equality which stifles local difference, the freedom of local 
institutions and the social bonds tying a community together. Central state intervention 
for Letwin therefore disempowers local communities and is blind to important local 
context and the local knowledge which Gray has identified as ‘a central value in any 
outlook that is truly conservative’ (Gray, 1997: 39). The answer is therefore ‘to 
adopt…an attitude of thoroughgoing localisation’ so that answers to problems can be 
‘formulated locally and in response to the particularities of local circumstance’ (Letwin, 
2005: 41-42). This would also have the effect of strengthening local institutions and 
networks, thereby conserving them in accordance with the conservative impulse. Letwin 
called this vision ‘the Neighbourly Society’. 
 
However, in the Neighbourly Society the concept of the state has receded as there is not 
the emphasis on state-redistributive oversight in the interest of positive liberty as under 
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New Labour. The role of the state is limited to sustaining ‘the balanced constitutional 
arrangements that frame the orderly community’ (Buckler, 2007: 42). This paved the way 
for cuts to (rather than increase in) public spending and thus provided an ideological 
justification for the austerity programme which would characterise the Cameron 
government. These adjustments in the meanings of and relations between the concepts of 
liberty, state, society and community in Parliamentary Conservative Party ideology had 
significant implications for the ideology of the institution of English planning which has 
these concepts at its core. 
 
This is most clearly seen in the transformation of the adjacent concept of the region, 
which became decoupled from the concepts of the state, community and liberty. Whereas 
the concept of the region was used by New Labour to think about the means by which 
greater equality of opportunity could be delivered through greater strategic state oversight 
and was presented as a means by which communities could influence their development 
plans, this was antithetical to the new Conservative ideology. Statutory regional planning 
was seen as overtly interventionist and redistributive and this triggered the conservative 
suspicion of the innate rationality of New Labour’s statism, and the very idea that such 
imposed rationalities should override the free and ‘organic’ development of a functional 
economic area. Under this conception, regional development agencies were criticised by 
the then Minister for Planning as being ‘a required creature of central government’ 
without a sufficient degree of local accountability (House of Commons, 2011: Ev 65). 
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The risk of unequal distribution of development opportunity and growth which so 
concerned New Labour and which may arise without strategic state oversight was entirely 
outweighed by the supposed benefits of the abolition of ‘one-size-fits-all 
policies…imposed by the centre whether or not they work locally’ (HM Government 
2010: 5). Therefore, the ideological arrangement of concepts in the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party ideology had little acknowledgement of statutory strategic planning, 
preferring instead an institutional arrangement which gives greater plan-making powers 
to local areas. The conservative concept of ‘community’ as it relates to planning was 
therefore much more ‘local’ than under New Labour as it was less closely associated with 
the concepts of the state and a ‘positive’ form of liberty. This can be seen in the 
employment of the term ‘neighbourhood’ rather than ‘community’ in Conservative 
planning discourse. The swift dismantling of regional planning and the introduction of 
non-compulsory Neighbourhood Development Plans following the formation of the 
Conservative-led coalition government in 2010 was clearly influenced by this ideological 
morphology. 
 
The transformed ideology of the institution of planning at the centre retains an emphasis 
on liberty - it is contained and controlled by the conservative conception of community, it 
is by no means rejected. However, it is a transformed conception of liberty in comparison 
with the more positive form under New Labour due to its decoupling from the concept of 
the state. There still remains the ideological imperative for deregulation, development, 
economic growth, choice, innovation, entrepreneurship and the creation of wealth. 
Indeed, it is these dimensions of liberty which the conservative ideology seeks to 
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encourage in neighbourhoods through removing the ‘artificial limits’ imposed by the state 
and by empowering them to create neighbourhood plans. Theoretically, these qualities 
now work within the organic limits imposed, and given meaning, by local traditions and 
institutions. However, this brings with it the potential for tension under practical 
circumstances where the wishes of local communities are in conflict with the neoliberal 
emphasis on development and national development priorities. In the early stages, this 
tended to be glossed over: ‘we can be both prodevelopment and 
prolocalist…decentralisation and development…I believe that they can and should 
reinforce one another’ (Clark, 2010). This is not overly problematic at the abstract level 
of ideology. However, when political ideology collides with real world planning 
problems and the institution which has developed over time to address them, its latent 
internal incoherence is made manifest and it is forced to rearticulate itself in sometimes 
contradictory ways in order to arrive at and legitimise practical solutions (Lees & 
Shepherd, 2015). 
 
This tension is most clearly expressed in the ongoing conflict arising from the 
coexistence of the Coalition’s localism agenda and the centrally directed emphasis on the 
need for the planning system to promote housebuilding and economic growth as 
enshrined in the National Planning Policy Framework (2012). While the localist aspect of 
the ideology influenced the removal of regional planning and the associated imposition of 
housing targets on local authorities, this new freedom also came with the responsibility of 
local authorities to set their own housing targets which must meet identified housing need. 
Local authorities therefore still had to deliver significant numbers of homes to meet local 
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need, but instead of this being coordinated and negotiated (or ‘imposed’) at the regional 
level, it was up to numerous separate local authorities to do this work themselves within 
the context of the centrally-imposed National Planning Policy Framework (2012) which 
included a new ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’.  
 
Therefore, despite the ideologically-driven removal of regional planning and the 
introduction of neighbourhood planning, plan-making and development management 
decisions at local level still had to meet housing need and the development objectives set 
out in centrally-imposed planning policy. It seems that the Coalition government could 
not entirely trust local areas to use their new freedoms in accordance with the neoliberal 
growth ambitions of central government, and so extended central state power through the 
mechanism of national planning policy so as to discipline local authorities and their 
communities in to delivering development, even against their wishes. In this way, we can 
see how the latent incoherence in the ideological amalgam of Cameronite Conservatism 
is institutionalised and made manifest through the practice of town and country planning. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding brief analysis of the ideological influences on the institution of English 
planning under New Labour and the Conservative-led Coalition government has 
illustrated how the concepts of liberty, the state, community and society are of core 
importance to English planning. The analysis has shown that institutional adjustments in 
planning at the political centre can be related to how the competing political ideologies of 
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New Labour and the Parliamentary Conservative Party sought to decontest these 
concepts. Both ideologies sought to use the concept of the community in similar ways to 
legitimise their ideological project, but with different institutional effects due to the 
different decontestations of the meanings of and relations between the concepts of liberty, 
society and the state. These differences influenced different decontestations of the 
adjacent concept of the region, and therefore influenced the institutional structure of 
national English planning surrounding regions.  
 
However, it should be emphasised that this paper is not arguing that this is where the 
explanation for institutional change must end. It is clear that there are other factors, not 
least pragmatism, political convenience and error rather than conspiracy. A full analysis 
of institutional change in national planning requires a theory which can also handle the 
agency side of the social scientific equation, and how different factions and interest 
groups both within the policymaking sphere and outside of it seek to shape the process 
through exerting power to create desired effects (which may be more or less successful). 
Nevertheless, the theory outlined here can help us think about the way in which ideology 
can shape the terms by which a policy problem is understood and communicated, and the 
way in which it is used to construct, legitimise and deliver institutional change. It also 
illustrates that any political ideology seeking to influence planning must do so on 
planning’s terms - when seeking to impose its meanings on planning an ideology must 
navigate planning’s own ideological legacies. 
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By conceptualising the institution of planning in the way outlined in this paper, the 
language of analysis which becomes available is one that has been developed by political 
theorists specifically to help us think about how political ideologies seek to adjust the 
terms by which political reality is understood, and therefore seek to lay out a programme 
for public political institutions. It thus turns our attention to the conceptual ideological 
structure of the institution of planning, and prompts an analysis of those deeply political 
concepts which give planning its form and which are also of concern to national political 
ideologies. By understanding how competing political ideologies seek to adjust the 
meanings of and relations between such concepts in planning, we can understand the 
rationale for some of the institutional adjustments at the political centre. This is 
important, as it is the institutional framework for planning set by the political centre 
which sets the terms of what is thinkable and therefore deliverable at the lower tiers of 
planning practice. 
 
The theory therefore provides a partial explanation for the stability and dynamism of the 
institution of English planning. In this sense, the institution of planning mirrors this 
quality of ideologies. It retains a degree of conceptual and structural coherence due to the 
ongoing presence and influence of fundamental concepts such as liberty, society, 
community and the state without which it would arguably cease to exist as an institution. 
Yet these concepts are prone to ongoing contestation and, therefore, change. It is not the 
case that these concepts can be made to mean anything - it is a function of ideologies to 
limit the range of their contestation. Thus some degree of institutional and ideological 
coherence endures, despite changes in meaning. This opens out the theorising of planning 
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as comprising competing and distinct ideologies. Planning is not ‘one ideology or three’ 
(Foley, 1960) - it is a complex and dynamic relational structure of ideologically contested 
concepts whose shifts can have significant implications for the policy programmes for 
planning set by the political centre and can create logical incoherence which finds 
expression in a fragmented policy framework. Crucially, using the theory set out here, 
this structure can be analysed, the particularities of shifts in meaning and the resultant 
shifts in policy programme understood. 
 
The context selected to illustrate the theory in this paper has been the English planning 
system and debates surrounding the transition from New Labour to Conservative 
dominance. The concepts identified as being of core structural importance to planning are 
therefore a function of the social and political history of planning in England. These 
concepts may not therefore be of core importance for planning in other contexts. 
However, the theory outlined here can be applied to different national contexts through 
an analysis of the characteristics of the main national political ideologies and the 
institutional histories of planning in those countries. In this way, concepts core to 
planning in other contexts can be identified and their structural shifts understood. 
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